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Wednesday, October 7, 2020 | History

2 edition of IMF conditionality and program ownership found in the catalog.

IMF conditionality and program ownership

S. Nuri Erbas

IMF conditionality and program ownership

a case for streamlined conditionality

by S. Nuri Erbas

  • 146 Want to read
  • 11 Currently reading

Published by International Monetary Fund, Middle Eastern Department in [Washington, D.C.] .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • International Monetary Fund.,
  • Conditionality (International relations) -- Econometric models.,
  • Economic assistance -- Econometric models.,
  • Loans, Foreign -- Econometric models.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementS. Nuri Erba*s.
    GenreEconometric models.
    SeriesIMF working paper -- WP/03/98
    ContributionsInternational Monetary Fund. Middle Eastern Dept.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination17 p. :
    Number of Pages17
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL21475272M

      Recent attempts to explain the implementation of conditionality incorporated in IMF-supported programmes have used the concept of ‘ownership’. A literature on ownership has begun to emerge and, alongside this, policy changes in the form of streamlining conditionality and broadening participation in its design have been introduced to encourage by: Downloadable (with restrictions)! The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance programs is considered from a political economy perspective, focusing on the question of why conditionality is needed if it is in a country’s best interests to undertake the reform program. It is argued that heterogeneity of interests must form the basis of any discussion of.

    Second, that ownership of programs by the borrowing country is crucial for their success. Hence, since both IMF conditionality and country ownership are necessary, the task is one of designing conditionality to maximize program ownership, subject to .   This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors Cited by:

    imf conditionality, government partisanship, and the progress of economic reforms 11 T ABLE 1 P ost-communist Economic Reform and IMF Program Design, Conditional on Executive Partisanship ( IMF conditionality and development policy space, Alexander E. Kentikelenis a,b*, Thomas H. Stubbs c,d and Lawrence P. Kingd aUniversity of Oxford, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford, UK; bHarvard University, Department of Sociology, Cambridge, MA, USA; cUniversity of Waikato, School of Social Sciences, Hamilton, New Zealand; dUniversity of Cambridge File Size: KB.


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IMF conditionality and program ownership by S. Nuri Erbas Download PDF EPUB FB2

Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the IMF's current rethinking of program design. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theory of program conditionality and ownership on the basis of Cumulative Prospect Theory.

Second, that ownership of programs by the borrowing country is crucial for their success. Hence, since both IMF conditionality and country ownership are necessary, the task is one of designing conditionality to maximize program ownership, subject to providing adequate safeguards for IMF lending.

Hence, since both IMF conditionality and country ownership are necessary, the task is one of designing conditionality to maximize program ownership, subject to providing IMF conditionality and program ownership book safeguards for IMF lending.

The paper discusses some recent proposals for enhancing ownership, and in particular, Cited by: Because IMF conditionality and country ownership are both necessary, the challenge is designing conditionality that maximizes ownership while providing adequate safeguards for IMF lending.

The article analyzes several recent proposals aimed at enhancing country ownership of policies contained in IMF-supported programs.

Summary: Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the IMF's current rethinking of program design. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theory of program conditionality and ownership on the basis of Cumulative Prospect : S.

Nuri Erbas. This article uses finance and agency theory to establish two key propositions about International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality and country ownership of IMF-supported adjustment programs. For the IMF, program ownership raises the probability of the success of programs and thus increases the “value” of the safeguards on its resources provided by conditionality.

Both IMF conditionality and country ownership have a clear rationale and the task is how to reconcile the two. The paper considers a number of proposals that have been. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.

Summary: IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic by: 7. IMF Conditionality. March 5, When a country borrows from the IMF, its government agrees to adjust its economic policies to overcome the problems that led it to seek financial aid.

These policy adjustments are conditions for IMF loans and serve to ensure that the country will be able to repay the IMF. program, that ownership gives a country the right to insist on making the final decisions, without coercion, on the contents of a program, and that acceptance by a country of responsibility for a program must be credibly demonstrated.

In their definition, policies are “owned” if they originate from borrowing country policy makers. In the words of Khan and Sharma (, p. 13), ownership “refers to a situation in which the policy content of the program is similar to what the country itself would have chosen in the absence of IMF involvement”.Cited by: Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the International Monetary Fund's current rethinking of program design.

This paper contributes to the literature by developing a. Recent attempts to explain the implementation of conditionality incorporated in IMF-supported programmes have used the concept of ‘ownership’.

A literature on ownership has begun to emerge and, alongside this, policy changes in the form of streamlining conditionality. Conditionality in its broad sense covers both the design of IMF-supported programs—that is, the macroeconomic and structural policies—and the specific tools used to monitor progress toward the goals outlined by the country in cooperation with the Size: KB.

Because the IMF was a cooperative institution, it would be hard to withhold financial support from members simply because of doubts about program ownership.

In such cases, the IMF might need to rely on prior actions and a strengthening of conditionality to assure program implementation. Hence, since both IMF conditionality and country ownership are necessary, the task is one of designing conditionality to maximize program ownership, subject to providing adequate safeguards for IMF lending.

the paper discusses some recent proposals for enhancing ownership, and in particular, makes a case for incorporating floating tranches and outcomes-based conditionality in IMF-supported adjustment.

ABSTRACT: The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance programs is considered from a political economy perspective, focusing on the question of why conditionality is needed if it is in a country’s best interests to undertake the reform program.

Institutions are d to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. Douglas C. North Nobel Lecture, Introduction Conditionality is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the IMF’s Size: KB.

Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the IMF's current rethinking of program design. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theory of program conditionality and ownership on the basis of Cumulative Prospect : S.

Nuri Erbas. The IMF database on monitoring of Fund arrangements has significant shortcomings. The Fund no longer monitors the application of structural conditionality and it lacks a framework for assessing the effectiveness of structural conditionality in program design and outcomes across programs outside of periodic reviews that are spaced 5 or 6 years apart.

The IMF’s Review of Conditionality provides. Summary: Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the IMF's current rethinking of program design.

This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theory of program conditionality and ownership on the basis of Cumulative Prospect Theory.Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs By JAMES BOUGHTON The IMF extends credit to countries with an external imbalance, conditional on the country’s commitment to implement economic policies that will restore by: Conditionality and country ownership of adjustment program (English) Abstract.

This article use finance and agency theory to establish two key propositions about International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality and country ownership of IMF-supported adjustment programs.

First, the authors suggest that the conditionality attached Cited by: